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Abstract—The Industrial Internet of Things drastically in-
creases connectivity of devices in industrial applications. In
addition to the benefits in efficiency, scalability and ease of
use, this creates novel attack surfaces. Historically, industrial
networks and protocols do not contain means of security, such
as authentication and encryption, that are made necessary by
this development. Thus, industrial IT-security is needed. In this
work, emulated industrial network data is transformed into a
time series and analysed with three different algorithms. The data
contains labeled attacks, so the performance can be evaluated.
Matrix Profiles perform well with almost no parameterisation
needed. Seasonal Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average per-
forms well in the presence of noise, requiring parameterisation
effort. Long Short Term Memory-based neural networks perform
mediocre while requiring a high training- and parameterisation
effort.
Index Terms—Time Series Analysis, Matrix Profiles, Machine
Learning, Mathematical Statistics, Industrial IT-Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last four and a half decades, automation and
industrial control have been ever changing. At the beginning of
industrial automation, hardwired connections between control
units and sensors or actuators respectively lacked flexibility
and adaptability. This led to the rise of Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs), allowing for a more versatile
interconnection of production units. Today, the introduction
of the Internet of Things (IoT) into production, the so-called
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), is emerging. The goal is to
increase flexibility and reduce set up and configuration times,
as well as to decrease cost and effort needed. Interconnectivity
of devices among different network areas is part of this
change of paradigm, as well as connectivity through trust
boundaries and over public internet. With all the benefits
arising from the IIoT, however, risks are evolving as well.
Over the last two decades, an increase in attacks on energy
and automation systems has been noted [1]. Many infamous
examples have been discovered, such as StuxNet, Industroyer
and Black Energy. Unfortunately, industrial Information
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Technology (IT) security has not evolved as fast as the IIoT.
While home and office appliances always had to combat
attacks, industrial applications have been deemed secure
due to two properties [2]: First, the industrial control, or
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), system
are physically separated from public networks. And second, the
network properties are too unique for an attacker to effectively
exploit them in case the perimeter was broken. The first
property obviously falls to the paradigm of interconnectivity.
As for the second one, Commercial Off The Shelve (COTS)
products and standardised hard- and software have been
introduced to industry as they have been into the consumer
IoT market, decreasing customisation and configuration effort
and increasing efficiency. This, however, enlarges attack
surfaces and makes the implementation of reusable exploits
possible. Thus, industrial IT security has become a major
issue over the past years. Unlike home and office intrusion
detection, however, security solutions are not as mature. Partly,
this is due to the scarcity of data to test industrial Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) applications on. As the communication
patterns of industrial systems differ from home and office-
based network traffic, the same IDS cannot be adapted
for industrial application. Due to the characteristic nature
of industrial network communication, time series analysis
lends itself readily to the application. Time series analysis
has been employed in many domains so far, e.g. in classic
intrusion detection. In this work, three time series anomaly
detection algorithms, Matrix Profiles, Seasonal Autoregressive
Integrated Moving Average (SARIMA)- and Long Short Term
Memory (LSTM)-approach are evaluated on an industrial
data set based on the Modbus/TCP protocol, a common and
open source communication protocol for industrial applications.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II gives an an overview of time series-based intrusion
detection, as well as industrial intrusion detection. After that,
the data set is introduced in Section III. In Sections IV, V
and VI, three time series-based algorithms for anomaly detec-
tion are applied to the data set and the results are discussed
respectively. This work is concluded in Section VII.
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II. RELATED WORK
SCADA has been identified as a likely and promising target
for cyber attackers [3], [4]. Temporal properties as a feature for
intrusion detection have been well-researched [5], [6]. Different
works discuss wavelet analysis of network data represented
as a time series [7], [8]. Furthermore, Wiener Filtering with
Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) modeling is evaluated
by Celenk et al. [9]. K-means clustering of time series data
is performed [10], as well as statistical analysis of temporal
distribution [11], [12]. Furthermore, neural networks have been
applied to industrial network intrusion detection. Filonov et
al. propose LSTM-based intrusion detection on a synthetic
data set that has been generated in their work [13]. Lin et
al. analyse the time distribution of synthetic and real SCADA
network data and identify deviations [14]. Linda et al. create
an intrusion detection system based on neural networks [15].
In addition to neural networks, other techniques have been
employed to detect attacks in industrial networks. State-based
intrusion detection was evaluated by Goldenberg and Wool [16],
Fovino et al. [17] and Carcano et al [18]. Additionally, rule-,
signature- and multiattribute-based intrusion detection systems
have been evaluated [19]–[21]. Since Security Event and
Information Management (SIEM)-systems are increasingly
relevant for industrial intrusion detection, Oman et al. proposed
a method to integrate intrusion detection into SIEM-systems for
SCADA networks [22]. There are many works addressing the
application of neural networks to intrusion detection for home
and office networks [23], [24]. Unfortunately, these works lack
standardised data sets for evaluation. Often, the KDD Cup’99
data set [25] that has been proven to contain artifacts that lead
to overfitting [26] is used. The data set we are analysing in
this work [27] has been analysed on packet level by Duque
Anton et al. [28].
III. TIME SERIES DATA SET FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
Modbus is a communication protocol for industrial
applications. It was developed by Gould Electronics Inc. that
is now owned by Schneider Electric [29]. Modbus follows a
Master/Slave concept. It has become a de-facto standard in
industrial communication [30]. There are different flavours
of the Modbus-protocol that are listed in Table I. Especially
TABLE I: Flavours of Modbus
Version Version
Modbus RTU Serial connection
Modbus ASCII ASCII-encoded serial connection
Modbus/TCP TCP/IP-based communication
Modbus over TCP/IP TCP/IP-based communication with checksum
the solutions based on the TCP/IP stack are widely used, as
the corresponding hardware is easily available. This helps to
reduce cost and implementation effort.
Lemay and Fernandez created a batch of Modbus/TCP
data sets of an emulated industrial application [27]. They
implemented a physical simulation model of electronic
circuit breakers. This physical model was connected via
a Modbus/TCP connection. It consisted of three to twelve
software PLCs that were queried periodically by one or
two Master Terminal Units (MTUs). Furthermore, aperiodic
user behaviour was introduced as queries. After the traffic
was recorded, exploits were introduced. These exploits were
generated with the penetration testing tool metasploit [31]
and are based on the TCP/IP layer. Unfortunately, no Modbus
protocol-specific exploits have been performed. However,
Lemay and Fernandez proposed a different batch of data
where they used the lowest bits in the Modbus payload as a
covert channel [27].
In this work, three different data sets have been evaluated:
ds1 is called “Moving two files Modbus 6RTU”, ds2 is called
“Send a fake command Modbus 6RTU with operate” and
ds3 is called “CnC uploading exe modbus 6RTU with operate”
in [27]. These data sets and their characteristics are listed
in Table II. In this table, the number of packets in total is
TABLE II: Characteristics of Analysed Data Sets
Name # of packets Length (s) # of mal. packets # of attacks
ds1 3,319 190 75 4
ds2 11,166 670 10 1
ds3 1,426 70 121 2
listed, the length of communication, as well as the number of
malicious packets, the number of attacks defined as sequences
of malicious packets. All data sets have polling intervals of
10 seconds. In contrast to ds2 and ds3, ds1 does not contain
human interaction.
In this work, each second of network traffic has been
aggregated as one data point, also called event. Features that
are collected and evaluated are, among others, the number of
protocols detected, the number of packets and bytes, the flags
and function codes in a one-hot encoding. Due to preliminary
analysis, three features are employed in the anomaly detection:
the number of packets per second, the number of port pairs
per second and the number of IP pairs per second.
IV. MATRIX PROFILES
Matrix Profiles are employed in order to detect time series-
based anomalies in the data sets in this section. At first, the
algorithm is introduced in Subsection IV-A. After that, the
three data sets introduced above are evaluated in the following
subsections. Finally, the performance of Matrix Profiles is
discussed in Subsection IV-E.
A. Introduction to Matrix Profiles
The Matrix Profile algorithm is a method to calculate
similarities in time series. It has been introduced by Yeh et
al. in 2016 [32]. A sequence from a time series is compared
to every other sequence of the same length within the time
series. The distances are calculated and stored. This distance
is a metric for similarity. If a sequence has a low minimal
distance, a sequence with a related characteristic is present
in the time series. If the minimal distance of a sequence is
relatively high, it is unique in the time series. This property is
suited to find outliers that can indicate attacks. The calculation
of the z-normalised distance is described in (1).
d(x, y) =
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(xˆi − yˆi)2
xˆi =
xi − µx
σx
, yˆi =
yi − µy
σy
(1)
By employing Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient [33] as shown
in (2)
corr(x, y) =
E((x− µx)(y − µy))
σxσy
=
∑m
i=1 xiyi −mµxµy
mσxσy
,
(2)
where
µx =
∑m
i=1 xi
m
, µy =
∑m
i=1 yi
m
(3)
and
σ2x =
∑m
i=1 x
2
i
m
− µ2x, σ2y =
∑m
i=1 y
2
i
m
− µ2y. (4)
By relating this with the Euclidean distance as shown in
(5) [34],
d(x, y) =
√
2m(1− corr(x, y)) (5)
the working formula for distance calculation is performed as
described in (6).
d(x, y) =
√
2m
(
1−
∑m
i=1 xiyi −mµxµy
mσxσy
)
(6)
x and y are time series, µ is the respective mean and σ the
respective standard deviation. m is the length of a sequence.
In this work, m has been set to 10. Each data point represents
the aggregated information of one second, the polling interval
is 10 seconds. Matrix Profiles, however, are robust to changes
in m, adaption of this parameter led to similar results as the
ones discussed in the following subsections. There are several
more efficient implementations of the distance calculation
available such as Mueen’s Algorithm for Similarity Search
(MASS) [35].
To obtain the Matrix Profile, each windowed sequence
of length m is compared to each other sequence of length
m in the time series. An interval of m2 before and after the
start of the sequence under observation is excluded, as this
would result in a trivial match. A sequence xi has a distance
of 0 from itself. After the distances are calculated, they
are stored in a matrix. The minimum of of each column is
stored, indicating the minimal distance of the given sequence
from any other sequence. A slight change has been made to
the algorithm as proposed in [32]: A windowed sequence
is only compared to sequences that have already occurred,
meaning only the distances of xi from all other xj with
j ∈ {0, ..., (i − m2 )} are calculated. In order to calculate the
distances for early time points as well, two periods of 20
seconds’ duration extracted from the end of ds1 were inserted
into the beginning of all data sets. These two periods do not
contain malicious or manual activity and can be considered
as a training data set, where reference patterns are stored so
as to prevent the first events of the investigated data from
being penalised due to their early occurrence. A possible
extension for Matrix Profiles could be the counting of similar
instances in a data set. With the algorithm employed, each
data set is checked with respect to having occurred before.
Checking additionally how often it has occurred so far could
help distinguish outliers that are seldom in comparison to
regular events, e.g. in large traffic collections.
As the concept of distance is not easily mappable to formal
metrics for classifier quality, no classic metric for classifier
quality is employed in evaluating Matrix Profiles. Due to the
length of the sliding window, the raise in distance is longer
than the attack itself. This would falsify a metric in creating a
large amount of false positives. Instead, a perfect threshold is
calculated in a fashion that it is minimal, while still able to
identify every attack.
B. Evaluation of ds1
The Matrix Profile of ds1 is depicted in Figure 1. The
curve describes the minimal distance of a sequence to any
other, previously occuring, sequence. As shown in Table II,
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Fig. 1: Matrix Profile for ds1
ds1 contains four attacks in total, depicted by the series of
dark gray dots. The attacks can be clearly distinguished by
comparing the distance values to an ideal threshold, which is
displayed by a solid line. Any feature is capable of indicating
the attacks. The four increases in distance map to the beginning
of the attacks. Only the first attack is detected with one second
delay. This is due to the fact that it falls into a polling request
perfectly, hardly altering the expected behaviour. Its second
event, however, clearly indicates an attack. As Matrix Profiles
employ a sequence length of m, 10 in this case, the distance
value is raised for longer than the attack duration. This could
be avoided by omiting anomalous values in the calculation
of distance. Furthermore, it is shown that Matrix Profiles are
capable of detecting attacks during the first second in which
they occur, which is an important property for in-time detection.
The increase of distance on the very end of the curves in
Figure 1 is an artifact due to the data formatting.
C. Evaluation of ds2
As shown in Figure 2, ds2 contains a lot of aperiodic traffic
indicating anomalous events. Only one of them is malicious,
marked by the dark gray dot. In this case, the number of
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Fig. 2: Matrix Profile for ds2
packets per second is the most reliable indicator for attacks.
It would generate only one false positive if an appropriate
threshold was used, as indicated by the solid line. The other
two features create more false positives. Despite the noise, a
relatively good detection of the attack is possible. Furthermore,
detecting anomalies that are not attacks is always an issue in
intrusion detection. For example, introducing context could
help in categorising singular events as anomalous but non-
malicious [36].
D. Evaluation of ds3
Considering the fact that ds3 contains manual, aperiodic
operations, the Matrix Profile approach works exceedingly well.
The distances are shown in Figure 3. Especially the numbers
of packets and port pairs are capable of identifying attacks
that are indicated by dark gray dots, if the perfect threshold,
illustrated by the solid line, is employed. As discussed before,
the rise in distance has a longer duration due to the length of
the sliding window and the influence of anomalous events on
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Fig. 3: Matrix Profile for ds3
the window. Still, Matrix Profiles are relatively robust to this,
and the location of an attack can be detected easily as it is the
first instance of a raised distance.
E. Discussion
Matrix Profiles are well suited to detect anomalies in data
with periodic characteristics while tolerating a certain amount
of noise. The predominant benefit is the ease of use as
there is only one hyperparameter - m - to be defined. The
algorithm is robust to changes in m so that fine-tuning is
rarely necessary. Furthermore, efficient implementations of the
distance calculation allow for in-time calculation of distances
and therefore for real-time discovery of attacks. The choice of
a threshold depends on the characteristics of a data set.
V. SARIMA APPROACH
In this section we carry out a SARIMA approach for properly
modelling and forecasting short-term future values of time
series extracted from regular network traffic with periodical
characteristics. Network intrusion can be identified by capturing
data points that vary enough from the prediction.
A. Seasonal ARIMA-processes
A stochastic process {Xt}t∈Z is called seasonal ARIMA-
process with period s and denoted by SARIMA(p, d, q) ×
(P,D,Q)s if {Yt}t∈Z with
Yt = (1− U−1)d(1− U−s)DXt for t ∈ Z (7)
is a stationary ARMA process of the form
A(U−1)F (U−s)Yt = D(U−1)G(U−s)t, t ∈ Z, (8)
where {t}t∈Z is the innovation process which is supposed to
be white noise, i.e. a series of uncorrelated random variables
with zero mean and finite variance σ2 , U denotes the shift
operator, i.e., U : Xt 7→ Xt+1, and A,F,D,G refer to the
characteristic polynomials related to the ARMA-process, i.e.
A(z) = 1−
p∑
k=1
αkz
k, D(z) = 1 +
q∑
k=1
θkz
k,
F (z) = 1−
P∑
k=1
φkz
k, G(z) = 1 +
Q∑
k=1
γkz
k.
(9)
( [37, Chap. 9.1.3]) We assume for simplicity that the innovation
process {t}t∈Z is Gaussian white noise, i.e., t ∼ N (0, σ2 )
for all t ∈ Z.
B. Data adaptive model choice
We consider the three data sets introduced in Section III:
ds1, ds2 and ds3. In order to apply asymptotic results from
mathematical statistics, it is reasonable to use the normal part
of the data without intrusion (i.e.,traffic labeled as ”0”) from
the largest dataset (i.e.,with the longest duration) ds2 as long-
term observation to model regular traffic. This also enables
us to highlight the benefit of using the SARIMA approach
for noisy data. The only intrusion in the aforementioned
data set is injected during the time interval from the 289th
to the 290th second without any effect on the subsequent
traffic. We therefore choose the time series of data points
obeserved from the 300th second to the 670th second of that
data set for modelling the normal network behavior (training
data). We then apply our forecast model to the remainder of
available data (test data) for measuring prediction errors so as
to identify attacks.
In order to bring out the effect of attack traffic and
avoid recording too much noise, we capture the increase
in the number of sent packets and the number of active
IP and port pairs separately at one-second intervals (instead
of smaller e.g. 10 ms or 100 ms intervals). From the large
sample correlations between the above crucial features, namely
corr(packet, port) = 0.9987, corr(port, IP) = 0.9922 and
corr(packet, IP) = 0.9878 (regular traffic from ds2), we
deduce strong linear dependency of them on one another.
However, since the vast majority of the data is captured during
normal system operation, it is not clear how meaningful these
numbers are once the actual anomalies occur. In fact, it turns
out that using the number of active port pairs for modeling
and testing yields more accurate result on intrusion detection
compared to using the other two features. This is due to
the fact that, except for ds1, manual operations are included
throughout the measurement which can cause considerable
fluctuations in the number of packets and IP pairs leading to
false positive results during intrusion detection, cf. Figure 4-(a),
-(b). In contrast, the port topology is in general not significantly
affected by ordinary manual operations, cf. Figure 4-(c), which
provides us with a feature that is robust against this type
of non-intrusion anomalies. In the sequel, we only present
a detailed treatment of the time series of number of active
port pairs per second which is denoted by {X ′t}t=1,...,N with
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Fig. 4: Intrusion (crossed out) among other anomalies
N = 670− 300 = 370 (sec.) extracted from ds2 for adjusting
our SARIMA model in Section V-A.
First, aiming to confirm the periodical character induced
by the predefined 10-seconds polling interval, we start our
approach by analysing the autocorrelogram of the time series
{X ′t}t=1,...,N , which is the plot of sample autocorrelations
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Fig. 5: Autocorrelogram of time series X ′
expressed in terms of
ρˆX
′
τ =
rˆX
′
τ
rˆX
′
0
with rˆX
′
τ =
1
N
N−τ∑
k=1
(X ′k − X¯ ′N )(X ′τ+k − X¯ ′N )
(10)
against lags τ = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, cf. Figure 5. The sample
autocorrelation oscillates with constant frequency of ten sec-
onds, which indicates the existence of a periodical component
with s = 10 in (8). In order to remove the heteroscedasticity
of data in respect of state dependent variance and motivated
by regression models with time series error terms [37, Chap.
9.5.1], we transform the original time series into a seasonally
centered one {Xt}t=1,...,N , that is,
Xj+us := X
′
j+us −
1
N/s
N/s−1∑
i=0
X ′j+is, (11)
for j = 1, . . . , s−1, u = 0, . . . , N/s−1. Since our time series
is not expected to have any time dependent trend, we choose
d = D = 0 in (7), thereby obtaining a SARIMA(p, 0, q) ×
(P, 0, Q)10 model with the time series {Yt}t=1,...,N given by
Yt := Xt for all t = 1, . . . , N . (Note that Y¯N = X¯N = 0.)
In order to determine the orders of the moving average
part (Q, q) and the autoregressive part (P, p), we analyse
the autocorrelogram and partial autocorrelogram related to
{Yt}t=1,...,N , respectively. The sample autocorrelations ρˆYτ for
τ = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 can be computed as in (10), whereas the
sample partial correlations pˆiYτ can be determined by means of
the Yule-Walker equation [37, Chap. 3.2.6], which gives
pˆiYτ = (Rˆ
Y
τ )
−1rˆY (τ)
with RˆYτ = (rˆ
Y
t−k)1≤t,k≤τ , rˆ
Y (τ) = (rˆY1 , ...rˆ
Y
τ )
T .
We then obtain possible choices of P and Q by considering
pˆiYks and ρˆ
Y
ks for k ≥ 0 and picking those values of k where
pˆiY(k+1)s and ρˆ
Y
(k+1)s begin to fall exponentially towards zero,
respectively. Moreover, analysing pˆiY1 , ..., pˆi
Y
s−1 and ρˆ
Y
1 , ..., ρˆ
Y
s−1
in the above manner provides possible choices of p and
q, respectively. The choice of hyperparameters P,Q, p, q is
not unique in general; a final decision among the possible
candidates can be made, for instance, by means of the
Akaike information criterion (AIC). Since our focus is not
on delivering the best possible forecast but on detecting
outliers and as these can also occur in early periods (cf.
e.g. ds1), also doing so with the least possible amount of
preceding data, we make a compromise of retaining accuracy
and computational simplicity and accept the combination of
orders (p = 4, q = 0) × (P = 1, Q = 0). Summing up,
the above consideration leads to our choice of the model
SARIMA(4, 0, 0)× (1, 0, 0)10 for {Yt}t=1,...,N .
C. Parameter estimation
Since we have assumed the innovation {t}t to be Gaussian
white noise, we use the least squares estimation which
approximately delivers the asymptotically efficient maximum
likelihood estimate of the parameters α := (α1, . . . , αp),
φ := (φ1, . . . , φP ) and σ for SARIMA(p = 4, 0, 0)× (P =
1, 0, 0)10. The functional we are going to minimize reads as
f(α, φ) :=
N∑
t=Ps+p+1
t(α, φ)
2
with
Y ∗t (α, φ) =
p∑
j=1
αjYt−j +
P∑
k=1
φkYt−sk −
p∑
j=1
P∑
k=1
αjφkYt−sk−j , (12)
t(α, φ)t = Yt − Y ∗t (α, φ), t > Ps+ p+ 1. (13)
It holds for the least squares estimate that
(αˆ, φˆ) = arg min
α∈Rp,φ∈RP
f(α, φ),
σˆ2 = MSE =
f(αˆ, φˆ)
N − Ps− p
with p = 4, P = 1, s = 10. We solve the minimization
problem numerically by means of a gradient descent procedure.
The result of the above approximation is presented in Table III.
We then obtain the one-step-ahead prediction of {Yt}t and the
residuals {t(αˆ, φˆ)}t in terms of (12, 13).
TABLE III: LS Estimates
Parameter Estimated Value
αˆ1 −1.0997 e−2
αˆ2 −9.9894 e−4
αˆ3 6.8105 e−4
αˆ4 1.3458 e−1
φˆ1 −1.1170 e−1
σˆ2 1.0239 e−1
In a final step, let us verify that indeed our model is
reasonable in the sense that the residuals t(αˆ, φˆ), t =
Ps+p+1, . . . , N are white noise. To this end, we consider their
sample autocorrelations ρˆ1, ρˆ

2, . . . and conduct the Ljung-Box
test [37, Chap. 8.2.2] that uses as test statistic
Q := N(N + 2)
H∑
k=1
(ρˆk)
2
N − k
where we choose H = b2√Nc and critical region
{Q > q1−α(χ2H−(Ps+p))} for a significance level of α =
0.05. It turns out that in our setting, Q = 33.40707,
q1−α(χ2H−(Ps+p)) = 36.9982.
D. Intrusion detection
Having modelled the regular traffic, we now detect network
intrusion as follows. For each test data set, we first transform
the relevant time series {Z ′t}t into a seasonally centred
one {Zt}t in the sense of (11) with fixed sample seasonal
means obtained from the training data {X ′t}t. Then we apply
the SARIMA(4, 0, 0)× (1, 0, 0)10 model and the estimated
coefficients αˆ, φˆ from Section V-C to the transformed test time
series {Zt}t and compute the one-step prediction errors eZt in
terms of (12, 13) for t = Ps + p + 1, Ps + p + 2, . . .. Due
to the different nature of the three test data sets in respect of
manual operations, which belong to non-intrusion anomalies,
we set individual thresholds for evaluating prediction errors in
different data sets. For instance, since no manual operations
are conducted in ds1, we can choose the 0.9995-quantile
of N (0, σˆ2 ) (= 1.05293) as threshold (corresponding to the
confidence interval for a significance level of 0.001) for the
absolute value of the prediction errors related to the number of
port pairs in that data set. In contrast, more manual operations
are observed in ds2 so that we set three times the 0.9995-
quantile of N (0, σˆ2 ) as threshold instead. As soon as the
absolute prediction error |eZt0 | exceeds the threshold at some
time t0, the traffic related to that state Zt0 in the time series
is classified as an intrusion. In order to prevent consequent
errors, we also remove the detected attack traffic from the data
immediately after detection, i.e., we replace the detected outlier
Zt0 by the corresponding regular value before we continue the
detection procedure for t > t0.
The final results of the above approach are summarised in
Tables IV, V, VI. It turns out that, by chosing the proper
threshold for each data set, all attack traffic can be accurately
detected within one second while producing only a single false
positive.
TABLE IV: Result on ds2, Threshold for |eZt |:
3q0.9995(N (0, σˆ2 ))
Begin of Attack Traffic (s) First Detection Time (s)
289.4079 290
1As this anomaly occurres before Ps+p seconds, the model is not applicable
here.
TABLE V: Result on ds1, Threshold for |eZt |:
q0.9995(N (0, σˆ2 ))
Begin of Attack Traffic (s) First Detection Time (s)
10.8980 N/A1
32.9679 34
71.5955 72
93.6086 94
TABLE VI: Result on ds3, Threshold for |eZt |:
q0.9995(N (0, σˆ2 ))
Begin of Attack Traffic (s) First Detection Time (s)
44.3293 45
- 63
64.1758 65
E. Discussion
Overall, the main advantage of the SARIMA approach is that
it is still powerful in the presence of noise. It also provides
a parsimonious presentation of time series with periodical
characteristics, using few parameters. However, it requires
individual model adjustment each time dealing with a new
time series.
VI. LONG SHORT TERM MEMORY
LSTM is a kind of neural network proposed by Hochre-
iter and Schmidhuber in 1997 to overcome the vanishing
gradient problem [38]. This problem occurs when long-term
dependencies are not considered accordingly by a recurrent
neural network. The network “forgets” the events and cannot
correlate dependencies. The concept of LSTM is presented in
Subsection VI-A. After that, the evaluation of LSTM on the data
sets is provided in Subsection VI-B, followed by a discussion
of advantages and disadvantages in Subsection VI-C.
A. Introduction to LSTM
LSTM is a kind of neural network designed to keep
information over long periods of time. Due to this ability,
LSTM networks need the ability to reset parameters. This can
be done with forget gates [39]. LSTM networks consist of cells
that are interconnected. One such cell is depicted in Figure 6.
The representation of Olah is followed in this work [40].
xt is the input, ht the output and Ct the cell state at time
step t. They are passed as inputs to the adjacent LSTM cell.
W is a weight vector and b is a bias. Furthermore, there are
the functions it, ft and ot. They represent the update function,
the forget function and the output function. To determine the
values, activation functions are used. They are either the tangens
hyperbolic (tanh) or the sigmoid function (σ). The forget value
is calculated according to (14).
ft = σ(Wf · [ht−1, xt] + bf ) (14)
𝒉𝒕+𝟏
𝒙𝒕
× +
σ σ tanh
× σ
tanh
×
𝑪𝒕+𝟏𝑪𝒕
𝒉𝒕+𝟏𝒉𝒕
Fig. 6: Schematic of an LSTM Cell
ht is derived from ht−1 and xt−1, as are it and C˜t. They are
calculated according to (15) and (16).
it = σ(Wi · [ht−1, xt] + bi) (15)
C˜t = tanh(WC · [ht−1, xt] + bC) (16)
C˜t is an internal state used to calculate the cell state, as shown
in (17).
Ct = ft ∗ Ct−1 + it ∗ C˜t (17)
The output variable ot and the output gate ht are calculated
according to (18) and (19).
ot = σ(Wo · [ht−1, xt] + bo) (18)
ht = ot ∗ tanh(Ct) (19)
Four different parameterisations have been employed in this
work: The length of input sequences has been set to 10 and
20, the number of layers has been set to 1 and 3. Furthermore,
400 neurons have been used. The training has been performed
on the ds1 that has been stripped of malicious events using
20,000 iterations with a learning rate of 0.001 and batch sizes
of 50. The LSTM networks have been used as predictors. They
predicted the next event which was then compared to the actual
event. In order to prevent consequent errors, the detected attack
traffic was removed from the data immediately after detection
before continuing the prediction process. All prediction errors
were calculated as the absolute difference of predicted and
actual value. After that, two threshold values were calculated.
The first threshold was the minimal value, so that all malicious
evens are above the threshold (MA). The second threshold
was chosen so that all non-malicious events were below the
threshold value (NM). Only the best performing set ups are
presented in the following.
B. Evaluation of LSTM
After setting the threshold as discussed in the previous
subsection, the true positives (tp), false positives (fp), true
negatives (tn) and false negatives (fn) are calculated. They
are used to calculate the F1-score (20) with precision (21) and
recall (22), as well as the accuracy (23). These metrics were
evaluated for each feature, packet count (PC), IP pairs (IP)
and port pairs (PP) respectively. The performance of LSTM
networks is presented in Table VII.
F1 = 2 · precision · recall
precision+ recall
(20)
precision =
tp
tp + fp
(21)
recall =
tp
tp + fn
(22)
accuracy =
tp + tn
tp + fp + tn + fn
(23)
C. Discussion
Table VII shows that the accuracy is always higher than
the F1-score. This is due to the fact that tp as well as tn are
considered in calculating the accuracy, while the F1-score puts
an emphasis on tp. As shown in Table II, the malicious events
are magnitudes smaller than the non-malicious ones. This
is a common problem in anomaly detection, as an anomaly
happens less frequently [41]. It leads to a negligible tp on
the accuracy, most prevalently shown with ds2: The only
attack was considered as non-malicious and thus a fn, but
the accuracy according to (23) appears to be almost perfect.
Nevertheless, LSTM performed relatively good analysing ds1
and ds3 considering some features.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, three algorithms for time series-based anomaly
detection were evaluated on a synthetic data set containing
network traffic of an industrial use case. They were analysed
with respect to their capability in detecting attacks that were
introduced to that data set, as well as the effort required to
parameterise and train the algorithms.
The Matrix Profile approach performs very well in
comparison. Most attacks can be found with few false
positives. Furthermore, the parametrisation effort requires only
one hyperparameter that is robust to change. Additionally,
the training data set is small. There are some noteworthy
extensions to Matrix Profiles, e.g. multidimensionality [42]
and concepts for the integration of domain knowledge [43],
providing further applications to intrusion detection.
The SARIMA approach provides high forecasting accuracy
and detection performance with few parameters. The theory of
time series analysis from mathematical statistics provides a
clearly defined procedure for the data adaptive model choice
and the model adequacy check, e.g. the Ljung-Box test.
Despite the high computational effort for training a large
number of parameters, the performance of LSTM network
is less convincing than that of the other two algorithms.
TABLE VII: Performance of LSTM
Feature
ds1 ds2 ds3
MA (%) NM (%) MA (%) NM (%) MA (%) NM (%)
PC
Accuracy 98.4293 97.9058 99.5529 99.8510 95.7746 95.7746
F1-Score 86.9565 75.0000 40.0000 0 80.0000 66.6667
IP
Accuracy 90.0524 98.9529 99.9529 99.8510 98.5915 92.3077
F1-Score 51.2821 88.8889 66.6667 0 92.3077 28.5714
PP
Accuracy 98.9529 99.4764 99.1058 99.8510 98.5915 92.9577
F1-Score 90.9091 94.7368 25.0000 0 92.3077 28.5714
It strongly depends on the nature of the data. Over- or
underfitting are important issues that have to be addressed.
Furthermore, LSTM networks require the specification of many
hyperparameters, e.g. number of layers, choice of activation
function and learning rate, whose fine tuning is tedious and
often depends on intuition and experience. That makes them
unsuited for non-experts.
In summary, the time series-based anomaly detection meth-
ods discussed in this work are effective in detecting cyber
attacks in industrial network traffic. Their efficiency could
be improved by incorporating context information [36] such
as authentication when operating manually, and sensible
aggregation of this information [44].
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